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Preface 
This collection of essays on Access to Civil Justice had its origins 
in a conference, organised and funded by the Ontario Ministry of the 
Attorney-General, in June, 1988. T his was part of a larger project begun 
and inspired by the Honourable Ian Scott. The conference was attended 
by a host of individuals and organisations from all over Canada and 
elsewhere, including lawyers, politicians, bureaucrats, academics and 
citizens. Generous additional funding was provided by The Law Foundation 
of Ontario. Most of the essays were originally completed for publication 
in 1989. 
Many people contributed their hard work and dedication to ensuring 
that the conference was a success. Especial thanks must go to Lorraine 
G raham, Beth Boswell , John Gregory and Patrick Monahan. The 
completion of this volume was made possible by the supportive efforts 
of Jonathan Anschell, Corinne Doan, Richard Epstein and Carole Trussler. 
October, I 990 
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Making The Justice System Balance: 
Beyond The Zuber Report 
Frederick H. Zemans 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The civil and criminal j ustice systems rely on a highly individualized 
dispute resolution process in which each litigant must both prosecute and 
present his or her own case with limited intervention by the court system 
and no direct involvement by the judiciary. Neil Brooks has noted that 
the adversarial system reflects the "political and economic ideology of classic 
English liberalism in three ways: by its emphasis upon self-interest and 
individual initiative; by its apparent distrust of the state; and, by the 
significance it attaches to the participation of the parties." 1 Much of the 
current discussion of access to justice is concerned with the inequities that 
flow from the adversarial system along with a growing recognition that 
participation of parties poses particular and difficult problems. Parties 
with limited resources and with small or diffuse claims face the greatest 
difficulties, especially when they are litigating against large organizations, 
be they trade unions, corporations, or an arm of government. 
2. THE ACCESS MOVEMENT 
It is worth emphasizing that the adversarial system reflects an 
individualistic, liberal view of society and grows out of the prevalent social 
und political philosophy of Western society. Indeed, most lawyers would 
u1guc th111 l hc foremost concern of the common law and the adversarial 
ll11111k- ' 1111 1111 11'• 11111i 11tr Ad v1 1 ~1 11 v :-.vhl1111"111 I 1111h•11 rd /flt' ( 't111111/11111.l11rlll'i1111• 
( l11/11J 11I 11~ 1111 
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system is the protection of individual rights.2 Litigation is considered as 
a means of determining disputes between two individuals or perhaps 
between two business entities. Despite the generous expansion of 
contemporary rules of procedure with respect both to joinder of parties 
and to claims, judges and lawyers alike tend to perceive civil litigation 
in terms of individuals and their individual causes of action. Thus, we 
find opposition to reform of the law of civil procedure as it relates to 
bringing class actions, despite various law reform studies that have been 
undertaken, notably in this province.3 These studies have recommended 
the liberalization of the possibilities for groups to litigate collectively, a 
more activist role for the bench, the introduction of contingency fees, 
and the abolition of the punitive provision that costs follow the cause 
in class actions. 
In framing the question of how to balance the justice system, we 
acknowledge the implicit suggestion that there is in fact a justice "system" 
and that it is in a state of imbalance. A recognition of the individualism 
that underlies the adversarial system and the problems it creates can be 
found in the federal government's recent review of the justice system, the 
Neilson Report, which questions the coherence of the administration of 
justice in Canada. The Report notes that, in addition to the disjointed 
and individualistic nature of Canada's justice system, there are two 
important, related issues: 
The first has to do with the extent to which the participants in the system 
as a whole arc interested in, or capable of, viewing their interaction in systemic 
terms. The common Jaw tradition discourages systemic rationalization, and 
this appears to have extended to not thinking about why relationships within 
the system are as they are, or how they could be improved. 
The second related issue is that historically there has been very little 
empirical data about what is actually happening within the justice system.• 
2 Ibid., at 98. Brooks quotes from the editorial page of a bar association journal to illustrate 
this argument: 
If you believe in the Anglo-Saxon common law tradition, that the individual is 
the important unit of our society, and the state exists to serve him, then it seems 
that the adversary system is preferable. If you hold a corporate view of society, 
that is to say, that the community is the important unit, and that the citi1en must 
be primarily considered as a part of the corporate unit, then it seems you should 
champion the inquisitorial system. 
3 See Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report 0 11 Class A N io 11s ( 1982). 
4 Minister of Supply and Services Canada, The Ju.l'l ic£• S 1'.\ l l'l/1 Improved Prowr1111 /J('/ll'('fl" 
A Study Team Report 10 1111! Neilson Tfl.1'k Fo rn• 0 11 Program /?('1• i1•w ( 1986) 111 11. 
and 13-15. In discussing the j uMicc system, the wiitc1s 11olc that the hn kllfll'S w1th111 
the justice system 111 c "ol 11 so111cwh11t tl•11111111s t•l111111t• tw· l11dl'l'd, ti ll' .ull111s111 11il , 
i11divid1111lislic llllll diM'l l'lin11111 y d1111111'll'I of I hl• lt•1.u ll p1 oil''"" II 111i~• ht ut I lllll"• hr t ho11~h t 
to 111 ~ 1111111 1\' 11, rll 11110 thr d1s1rn11lt't l 1l'111t1011•h1p' 111lhr 111 ~ t ll 11l 1nm p11 hl11 11 111 pll\nll 
I hut .-n111pm1 t 111 111 11 11111 ul t ha ·~ .11 111 ' 
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To what extent are reforms appropriate? And will such reforms advance 
values that we wish to codify and incorporate into the justice system?5 
Should the state encourage class actions, and what are the appropriate 
goals of such litigation? An analysis of the administration of justice must 
evaluate the premises and philosophical underpinnings of legal aid, 
contingency fees, and pre-paid legal services.6 
I do not believe that we can embark upon a discussion of law, 
substantive or procedural, as if legal issues could be considered in a political 
vacuum. Richard Abel believes that much of the writing on legal aid (as 
well as other areas of the common law and, in particular, procedural 
discourse) is flawed by the insistence on divorcing law from politics. He 
writes: 
The prevailing ideology of advanced capital ism- liberal legalism - is grounded 
on that very premise. The institution of legal aid itself attempts to fulfill 
the promises of liberal legalism without first effecting any change in 
fundamental political relationships. 7 
Though l do not intend to undertake an analysis of the political philosophy 
underlying the Canadian civil justice system, I urge that we confront the 
fact that in each area of decision-making-class actions, legal aid, and 
the independence of both the judiciary and the legal profession - the 
determination of the approach or role to be assumed by a lawyer or a 
judge is often a political, and seldom a value-free, decision. 
The belated introduction in Canada of a state-funded legal aid scheme 
is an historic example. The political reality is that neither the legal profession 
nor any of the partners in Canadian federalism exhibited any significant 
concern with respect to "access to justice" prior to 1967, when the Ontar~o 
Legal Aid Plan was introduced. We can either criticize or praise the 
"judicare" model of the mid-1960s, but despite the introduction of a legal 
services model in the U.S., we opted for a combination of the English 
and Scottish models of legal aid. The more fundamental issue is that, 
until 1967, there was no political will to attempt to rectify the most egregious 
wrongs within the adversarial system. Instead, in the best interests of the 
5 Brooks, note I, above, at 98. Brooks makes the point that it is only recently that we 
have come to recognize that procedure is not value free. He refers to the writings of 
Cappelletti and Damaska. We can no longer attempt to right a system without attempting 
to 11ntlcrM1111d the roots and origins of that system. 
6 Note 4, 11bovc, at 13. ·1 he hdcral Study Team on The Justice Sys1em acknowledges 
th111 thc1 c is ta justice ,ystem but with very weak interrelationships between the participants. 
" I has as hlTllllNc tlw1 c is no trndition ol doing so. nor is there a generally held perception 
111111 111111 1• systl·11111• tl1111k111µ 11ml lwtt1•1 i11loi 11111tion 11bo11t how one purt of the structure 
11lk1 t• nth1·1., wn11ld lw l11•lpl11I " lrl 
\111 I I .1w W11h1111t 1'1111111" I 1p11l l\11l l la11h1 \d \'11111 rd < 11p11 11 l1"11" (1QR~) l2 U,C I ./\. 
I tl o' 11 t .a t l/h IH\ 
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dominant elements in Canadian society, the myth was perpetuated that 
all citizens have a right to have their disputes dealt with by their court 
system. 
Lawyers, as well as law students, were as aware in the 1960s as we 
are today that our court system is slow, that it is expensive, and that 
courts are not where the average citizen has his or her disputes or conflicts 
resolved. In the 1960s, our country was coming of age. We recognized 
that we had the opportunity to develop certain unique aspects of the social 
contract - particularly medical care- but there was little or no concern 
on the part of the public or its elected representatives for legal care. Going 
to law was not equated with going to the hospital. Health care was 
considered to be a basic human necessity, while legal care was considered 
to be a luxury to be enjoyed, or rather endured, only when absolutely 
necessary, for example, in the context of a divorce or perhaps a motor 
vehicle accident claim. 
Are Canadians today interested in analyzing the systemic problems 
of the administration of justice? The Report of the Ontario Courts Inquiry, a 
written in 1987, gives a qualified but important "yes" and offers a significant 
analysis of the justice system as a whole, in addition to its well-publicized 
recommendations as to court jurisdiction and court administration. In 
his analysis of the justice system, M_r. Justice Thomas Zuber accepts the 
challenge of addressing the administration of justice as a coherent whole. 
His report sets out the general principles to be applied in assessing the 
justice system and recommending reform.9 Perhaps the most significant 
element of this report is its strong articulation of the responsibility that 
the court system and the administration of justice owe to the Canadian 
public. Zuber states that the "court exists to serve the public. Lawyers, 
judges, court registrars and court clerks all serve the justice system," which 
in turn, according to the author, exists for the benefit of the public: 
This Inquiry would go a step further and state emphatically that not only 
counsel should be cast in a social service role, but that the entire court system 
has a purpose only to the extent that it serves the community.10 
8 Zuber, Report of the Ontario Courts Inquiry ( 1987). 
9 Ibid. , at 66-70. Courts grew out of the social necessity to provide n way of resolving 
disputes that did not threaten the fabric of society. The courts con tinue to exist because, 
despite their problems, the people have confidence in the integrity uncl wi~dom of the 
court, and they continue in times of stress to turn to the cou1 t fo1 the vind icntion ol 
their rights. 
10 //1111., !It 66-70. Thl· Rl·po1t ndoptk t h~ 11 pp1011d1 ol thl' noted A111rti t•1111 11111n·d u111llst, 
A1th111 I . V11ntll'1h1lt, 1111tl llS~t· rt \ thl' 1111h1 nl t'V\'IV 11111-111111 Ill II prn111pt 11111l 1•ll11'ir11t 
11 i11l 1111111·11M11111hh- rnwl 1111tl le• 1 <'p11 ·~1·1u11tiu11 hy <'n1t1p1•t1·1J1 l11wv1•1' 
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Committed to the vindication of the rights of individuals, the classic 
liberal values embodied in the Canadian adversarial system are perceived, 
with some legitimacy, as being opposed to community or communitarian 
values. In the chapter entitled "General Principles Underlying Court 
Reform," Zuber affirms the responsibility of the justice system to the 
community, taking our discussion well beyond the traditional "access to 
justice" concerns of economic accessability and delay. By articulating the 
straightforward premise that the justice system exists not only for the 
benefit of lawyers or judges or for individual litigants, but for the public 
benefit, the report has offered Canadians a unique analysis of the provision 
of civil justice.11 The Zuber Report challenges its readers to develop models 
of analysis that broaden our understanding of how the justice system affects 
the various socio-eonomic communities that make up contemporary 
Canadian society. In acknowledging that the courts and the administration 
of justice must serve the community, Zuber's report raises a clear challenge: 
the important requirement is to understand the needs of the communities 
that the justice system is serving. 
This paper accepts the major findings of the Zuber Report, that is, 
the inefficiency, the costliness, and the lengthy delays of the administration 
of justice. Tn considering these concerns and Zuber's recommendations, 
I analyze in some detail two approaches- one private and one public-
to these issues. Similar analysis would be beneficial when considering the 
implications of contingency fees, lawyers' advertising, and the use of 
paralegals and non-lawyers in providing traditional, case-by-case, legal 
services and more broadly-based community education and development. 
The challenge remains for Canadian sociologists of law to study and analyze 
the extent to which the administration of justice has fulfilled its obligation 
as articulated by the Zuber Report of serving and responding to the diverse 
needs of our community. 
Access to justice is a concept that has only recently come of age 
in Canada. It is, in many ways, surprising that law and particularly the 
justice system was so belatedly perceived as a legitimate social service. 
11 An holistic approach, which attempts to approach civil justice issues from the perspective 
of a social service that responds to the needs of its community, will require a new framework 
for analysis. If the fundamental values of the justice system are moved from an 
individualist ic aprroach to a more collectivistic approach, the role of judges and lawyers 
in th<: administration of justice-courts and legal services - must be reconsidered. 
('e r Lu inly, the significant involvement of citizens' groups in the administration and "control" 
ol k1111I scr vices for 1111 classes of society would seem appropriate. As well, the opportunity 
Im 11 11 11· l11wym~ lo p111t 1dp111c 111 the i11s1kc system as the "deliverers" of Lhc service, 
kll<'h llN l'11111 111111u1 y lt11111 I wen kt•r, w1t l11 11 11111 l'1 111 ic- systt:m 01 11dvocutcs und conveyancers 
111 th1• p11111111· ~ntc11, wu11ld h11n 1 11 ht•11•1•1111~1th•H·d l fl1 111 th1· pc1sp1•1·1 1w ol thc funders 
11 11 111 •1111 illl h1' ll'l11 1111cl 111011 1111pu11 111ctly !he lll'!'tl~ nl llrl' p11 hh~· 
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The history of the access movement and particularly of legal aid has yet 
to be written, but it is generally agreed that public awareness of the need 
for legal aid services dates only to 1951. 12 The Ontario Legal Aid Plan 
was introduced to assist indigent persons with defence representation in 
serious criminal matters on a voluntary basis. But, as indicated, the social 
policy commitment to legal aid had to await the Attorney General of 
Ontario's Task Force on Legal Aid, which in 1965 recommended that 
the English judicare and the Scottish duty counsel systems be introduced 
to Ontario under the administration of the Law Society of Upper Canada 
and funded by the province.13 
Writing in the introduction to Access to Justice and the Welfare State, 
Mauro Cappelletti and Bryant Garth reiterate the concern that has been 
expressed by many scholars who have studied and written about recent 
attempts to develop justice systems that are responsive to the needs of 
particular local and national societies: 
"Access to justice" implies continuing social development, involving a constant 
debate about how much access to provide and how much and what kind 
of justice should result.14 
Formal, rule-oriented attempts to provide equality of access have 
generally been found inadequate. In practice, they have amounted to denials 
of effective entry to, and use of, the court system, rather than providing 
more preventative legal services. It is likewise true that access to traditional 
models of dispute resolution- particularly the court system- is obtainable 
only at a relatively high cost. This is particularly the case if such access 
reforms are confined, as has been the case in Canada, to subsidizing lawyers 
and to using traditional judicial approaches. The pressure of costs for 
legal a id, judicial appointments, new court houses, and for the 
ad ministration of justice generally, especially in times of strained 
governmental budgets, militate in favour of "wholesale justice,"15 which 
may in turn come only at the expense of the quality of justice. Two 
contemporary attempts to overcome the inequities of the Canadian justice 
12 The Ontario Legal Aid Plan was introduced in 1951 with the rassing of ·1 he Law Society 
Amend ment Act, S.O. 1951, c. 45, which enabled the I.aw Society ol Upper Canada 
to establish a voluntary scheme to provide legal aid . 
I ~ Sec l?eporr of Joi111 Co111111111et• 011 f,egal A 1d ( 1965). 
14 <'llflllllCll i & Garth, "Acres~ 10 .Justice and thl' Wl·llarc Sl!ltc: An l11 11od11l'l 1CH1," rn 
C '11 r1wlil't1i , ed., 11 l'n'.1".1 / 11 J11.1·tl1·c and llw W1•lfi11·1• S11111• (I 9K I ) 111 2 
I ~ Thul , ill I ; ('uh1hn·si, "/\('('I''' lo h1klr\'l' l1lld S11 h~ t 1111t1Vl0 l11 w l(d111111 11•11111 Aid101 
thl' I OWt l M11hll1• ( 111 ~' .. Ill ('1111p\'lh-tt1 .'ii ( 1111111 nl~ .. ln1•11 '" .f111//11' I 1111·11111111 
(11111•11t1t1l f'1'1\fll'I I/I'< I \Ill I ( 11171)) tll lh'I 
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system will be discussed in this article: pre-paid legal services, and legal 
aid services. Both innovations await a more detailed and systematic analysis. 
3. PRE-PAID LEGAL SERVICES 
Pre-paid legal service is perhaps the most significant comprehensive 
alternative to fee-for-services to develop in Canada during the 1980s. By 
paying a fixed premium, either personally or in concert with his or her 
employer, a subscriber, generally a middle-income earner, is entitled to 
certain legal services free of charge when required.16 As with any insurance 
scheme, all participants pay a premium that is fixed on the presumption 
that only a limited number of subscribers will require legal services. 
Pre-paid legal services schemes have existed in the United States for 
nearly two decades but have only begun to be developed in Canada during 
the last few years. By the early 1980s, pre-paid services were becoming 
popular with American workers and were being requested as a fringe benefit 
by their unions, the most extensive being developed by the United Auto 
Workers (U.A.W.) for employees of General Motors, American Motors, 
and Chrysler. As well, one of the major American chains of private legal 
clinics (Hyatt Legal Services) began to provide pre-paid legal insurance 
to a union around the same time but was not initially prepared to provide 
pre-paid legal services to the general public as it was not considered 
economically viable. 17 I underline that legal services plans in the United 
States have grown both in numbers of subscribers and in services provided. 
They are being marketed by a large number of the major insurance 
companies as well as by direct mail organizations such as Diners Club, 
Visa, and Mastercard.18 The growth in both the market and models of 
16 Wydr7ynski, "The Development of Prepaid Legal Services in Canada," in Evans & 
Trebilcock, eels., Lawyers and 1he Consumer Interest: Regulating the Market for Legaf 
Services ( 1982). Legal services plans are designed to create a risk and cost-sharing or 
cost-spreading arrangement on the premise of "collective acquisition of legal services 
to bcncltt the whole." See also Wydnynski, "Access to Legal Services: Prepaid Legal 
Services" (unrublishecl paper rresented to the Conference of Canadian Law and Society 
Assn., I l11 111i ltun, 1987). 
17 W111tt•1, " More WM~cr s Gni11i11g l'rcp11id Lcg<rl Insurance" (1982) 68 Am. B<rr Assn. 
I I ~~11. I 11 S1•p1t·111hr1 I 9X2, 11 yu tl I .cg:rl Sci vices agreed to provide rre-p11id legal insurance 
to !Ill' Sh,•1•1 Ml'tul W111 ~l'l s 11111·111111 1011111 Assn. covering over 6,000 sheet metal workers 
111111 1111·11 I 111111111'\ 
IH 1111111 N111<11~11111111 l1111lwl1m"ll'lll-ll·ll'11lrl 1.m1·1· 1•>111 lh 
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legal services is being generated by employee groups and, it would seem, 
by the public as well. '9 
The first private Canadian legal services plan was created in 1978; 
it was a prepaid, open-panel scheme through the United Grain Growers 
Services of Winnipeg. In the same year, the Prepaid Legal Services Program 
of Canada, a resource centre to provide information and to conduct research 
on pre-paid legal services in Canada, was established in Windsor. In spite 
of these early developments, growth of pre-paid programs in Canada has 
not kept pace with their growth in the United States. The reasons are 
clear: provincial law societies have not encouraged (and in some instances 
have discouraged) pre-paid legal services, the federal and provincial 
governments have not exhibited any commitment, and consumers do not 
seem to have perceived a need. In 1980, the Canadian Labour Congress 
condemned the schemes as "make-work" plans solely for the benefit of 
lawyers.20 
Though pre-paid and legal insurance had been discussed for more 
than a decade, it was not until the United Auto Workers' (now Canadian 
Auto Workers (C.A. W.)) 1984 agreement with General Motors that a large 
work-force was brought within a private legal services plan in Canada. 
When the C. A. W. included the same provisions in its contracts with Ford, 
Chrysler, and Navistar (formerly [nternational Harvester), it became 
apparent that with over 75,000 union members in Ontario and Quebec, 
each receiving approximately $60 per year from his or her employer, 
approximately 4.5 million new dollars were about to be expended annually 
on such legal services. Although these funds are small in comparison to 
federal and provincial expenditures on legal aid, they are nonetheless 
significant and were recognized by the organized legal profession to be 
the tip of the legal insurance iceberg. 
Confrontation and eventual litigation between The Law Society of 
Upper Canada and the C.A.W. Plan did not arise out of consideration 
of the needs of union members. Rather, the dispute arose because the 
governing body was concerned about whether the Plan would be closed, 
19 Ibid., at 16. Taub further suggests that one of the reasons that there has been such 
a significant increase in the growth of legal services plans in the U.S. is that "they might 
create a better public image and more business for the increasing numbers of American 
lawyers." 
Not long ago, you had to be a member of a major labour union 10 be e ligible 
for a prepaid legal services plan. In recent years, however, the number of nva ilnblc 
plans has increased significantly, and another mujor cxp1111sio11 is in1111i1w11l. I hONl' 
who market legal services plans arc going ultc1 1ht• i11tlivid1111I co11s1111w1 1111d ii 
!heir plans sell. 111111111cys may g11 i11 not o nly 11w1<· h11si1wss, h111 11lso n lwllt·1 p11hl1t 
illlll/\l', 
>() Wvd11vnsk1, "/\n1·s~ 111 I 1•••111 'i1• 1 rn·t·~ l'1q1111d I 1·~11 1 '>r1111.- '111111 111 . 11h1111, 111 I 
Making The Justice System Balance / 245 
using "salaried" lawyers, or open, offering freedom of choice to use private 
practitioners as well as staff lawyers. The Law Society opposed the 
requirement that all private lawyers who accept work for plan members 
must agree to become co-operating lawyers and be paid at the proposed 
fee schedule of $60 per hour. 21 In some respects, the confrontation between 
Ontario's Law Society and the C.A.W. Legal Services Plan was similar 
to that which arose 15 years earlier from attempts by the Ontario Legal 
Aid Plan to thwart salaried clinic lawyers, and specifically Osgoode Hall 
Law School's Parkdale clinic. In both instances, while the issues were 
couched in terms of the right of consumers of legal services to freedom 
of choice, the heart of the matter was a concern by the profession to 
preserve the private, individualized model of legal services that had 
characterized lawyers' services for the better part of two centuries. New 
funding of legal services was encouraged by the professional leadership 
as long as the private practitioner remained the model of delivery and 
control rested with the profession.22 
As with salaried legal aid lawyers, the profession ultimately recognized 
that the C.A.W. plan should continue to operate2J using salaried staff 
lawyers and either co-operating lawyers in private practice who had agreed 
to the $60 hourly fee or non-co-operating lawyers who could extra-bill 
the Plan member. This model was accepted by the representatives of the 
C.A.W. Plan to avoid litigation and to allow the Plan to grow. As with 
the medical profession, the question of extra-billing of professional fees 
rather than the quality or type of service was the source of tension. 
Although there is limited statistical data, the C.A. W. Legal Services 
Plan appears to have been successful in encouraging use of the plan by 
union members and their families and by retirees. There is a usage rate 
21 It is significant that by November 1985, the Treasurer of the Law Society of Upper 
Canada wrote to the originators of the C.A.W. plan and to the legal profession stating 
that participation in the plan might constitute unprofessional conduct. See letter from 
Pierre Genest to U.A.W. Canadian Legal Services Plan, November l , 1985, which was 
circulated to a ll lawyers on the rolls of the Law Society of Upper Canada. A press 
report, later in 1985, noted that lawyers could be "suspended or disbarred from practice 
where such conduct is found." See Inside Business (28 December 1985). 
22 lhe Legal /\id Committee of The Law Society of Upper Canada, Community Legal 
Sl'rVICl'S ( 1972). 
23 I i1ig111ion ccn~cd after an agreement between the C. /\.W. and the Law Society of Upper 
('111111 <1 11 w11~ rl'llchcd in Muy of 1987. ' I he agreement allows 1he plan to operate so as 
10 ollt•1 11111011 llll"ll l hl11S llrt• nppoil1111i1 y 10 choose from eit her staff lawyers or outside 
h1wv111s ll 111ww1, t lr llM' 1111·111ht·1N wlro N~ll·t· 1 1111 outside luwycr that docs not limi l his 
111 hr1 I rr~ tn 11n1111i1111n• wilil llrr pl1111 will n11lv hr H't1t 1 b111~rd 111 !ht· 11111011111 M'I 0111 
111 1111 pli111", h 1 ~· hrd11lr 'il'I· I 1111111111111 /'11 ·11 N1•111/1 1 ( 1•1 ~t 11\ 1'18/) 
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of 44.8% in 1987, and 43.0% in 1988.24 Of interest is the comparative 
use of staff and private lawyers during the Plan's early years: 
1986 1987 Isl Quarter 1988 
Cases % Cases % Cases % 
Staff 17,873 51.2 18.014 51.8 5,659 56.0 
Co-operating 9,806 25.2 8,447 24.3 2,305 22.8 
Non-co- 7,960 22.8 8,027 23.0 2,058 20.4 
operating 
Notary 278 .8 301 .9 77 .8 
Total 34,917 100 34,789 JOO 10,099 100 
The division of lawyer use has remained equal between the staff lawyers 
and the co-operating and non-co-operating lawyers, with some indication 
that there may be a gradual increase in staff lawyer use. The distribution 
of work between co-operating and non-co-operating lawyers remains 
unclear at this early stage of the Plan's development. 2s The Plan's caseload 
is divided between wills and estates (33%); real estate, including real estate 
litigation (37%); family law (15%); and other litigation, such as landlord 
and tenant, motor vehicle, consumer, administrative law and criminal ( 15%). 
Whether the Plan's members are using legal services for the first time 
or to a greater extent remains to be examined. The initial data from the 
C.A.W. Plan indicates a higher rate of use than in the United States U.A.W. 
Plan, which currently averages a user rate of 38%. The relative newness 
of the Canadian plan and limited available data does not alJow us to 
determine the extent to which the plan is providing "advice only" or actually 
24 This data was received in correspondence from the Executive Director of C.A.W. Legal 
Services Plan to the writer, dated 7 June 1988. Usage is calculated as follows: 
100/ l x (number of active employees + number of retirees)/ number of cases opened 
per year = usage %. 
25 Although the caseload is higher during the first quarter of 1988, as is the use of staff 
lawyers, the figures are similar to those of the first quarter of 1987, when staff lawyers 
received 54.3% of the cases and non-co-operating lawyers 21.7%. Similarly, u~age rates 
were higher during the first quarter of 1987, at 49.2%, as compared to 50.1% for 1988. 
The significance of the increased use during the first months of the ycu1 us well us the 
choice of staff lawyers with increased cim: louds uwaiti. fu1thc11 cst,111ch 11 11d 111111lvs"· 
C. A.W. l.cg11J Services Plun is opcrnti11g Nt·vc11 staff offo:cs, with Nix 111 0111111111, 
und one in Quebec. As nf .lunr I 'II<~. t h1·11· wnk 11 to t11l ol I09 ~111plov1•1·~. IO 111 wh11111 
Wl'H' lnwy1· 1~ . Only two l11wy1•1s 111 c 111 vulwrl wit h 11d1111111~t111t 1011 111 tl11 ht 11rl 111 111 1• 
wl11lr JH Jnwvn~ 1111 l11111t1·1l 111 th1\l'V<11~1. 111 11 11111 '\ 
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handling and completing matters. 26 The high percentage of wills may suggest 
that many users of the Canadian Plan are using necessary legal services 
that had previously been considered too expensive. 
In response to the considerable publicity and interest in the C.A.W. 's 
plan, three insurance companies in Ontario announced in 1986 that they 
were preparing legal insurance schemes, and one offered a truncated form 
of legal insurance that provided all-hours legal advice by phone to policy 
holders.21 As welJ, the Law Society of Upper Canada, in conjunction with 
the Ontario branch of the Canadian Bar Association, was investigating 
the possibility of making available its own plan, which was intended to 
provide broader coverage than the C.A.W.'s plan.2s 
The principal benefit of pre-paid plans is the increased access to the 
justice system that they offer through some degree of equalization of the 
availability of professional services. Citizens who would not seek legal 
services have the opportunity, through the limited, fixed individual costs, 
to consult a lawyer. Thus the decision to consult a lawyer is made on 
perceived needs and professional advice rather than the client's ability to 
purchase legal services. The extent to which the pre-paid model will deliver 
reasonably-priced legal services in Canada remains unclear, but we have 
confirmed that salaried legal aid service is generally less expensive than 
that provided by private lawyers delivering comparable services.29 With 
the services becoming routine, economies of scale, the use of parapro-
fessionals, computerized practices, and lower overheads, it may be safe 
to predict that pre-paid will also be a less expensive delivery model than 
the private bar. As Wydrzynski has written, 
prepaid legal service plans do not provide coverage for every conceivable 
legal problem which could arise. Control of costs is critical to plan survival 
and benefits must be geared to the financial reality of the plan. While the 
benefits must correspond to the members' needs, extravagant legal service 
must necessarily be excluded. Thus, most plans provide coverage .for routine 
legal services only: those needs which are most likely to be encountered by 
the middle-class consumer (e.g. purchase and sale of real property, drafting 
of a wi ll, family law matters, etc.) Benefits are tailored to the members' perceived 
needs, and then usually only those services which are capable of cost controJ.30 
26 During the first 15 months of its operation, 52,000 files were opened, and more than 
half of all eligible employees used the services of the plan. The average annual usage 
has been greater than that for similar plans for auto workers in the United States, which 
cur rr11Lly 11verngcs about 38%. 
27 C'111wfo1d, " B1 c11k Out in Upper C11nnd11" (1986) 10 Can. Lawycr 4 al 22. 
21< //11r/ , 111 Ill 
21J S1·1· C'1111ml11111 11111 Ass n N111 1011n l I 1·11111 Aul I 11 11Nnn C'u111111illcc, l~·gnl Aid f)<'fiw•rv 
Al11tf1•/1 I / 1111111111111 !'11111•1 ( ll)H /) 
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Pre-paid schemes embody a relatively straightforward concept of risk-
sharing. By spreading the cost of individual legal services across a broad 
cross-section of society, legal costs become more affordable for the majority 
of Canadians. As the plans are privately funded by employer, and sometimes 
by employee contributions, or by insurance companies, various designs 
with various services can be developed and marketed. Although the 
organized legal profession remains committed to monitoring and, perhaps, 
in some instances, to controlling pre-paid developments, both the 
confrontation between proponents of the C.A. W. Plan and the Law Society 
of Upper Canada and the resolution of this confrontation indicate that 
attitudes are changing. With appropriate endorsement by government and 
a commitment by pre-paid plans to provide legal services at a reasonable 
cost, the organized legal profession has accepted the inevitability and the 
utility of pre-paid group legal plans. Although the legal profession may 
attempt to thwart new access models on the grounds of limited choice 
of counsel or on the basis that fees offered to private practitioners are 
considered too low, such opposition is futile and counter-productive in 
the face of the growing success of the C.A.W. Plan and the recent 
endorsement of pre-paid plans by the federal government.31 Diana Majury 
wrote in 1981 that 
The most valuable tool for public education in this area will be the existence 
of successful legal service plans, responding to the presently unmet legal needs 
of middle and lower income Canadians. Once one or two major plans are 
operational in Canada, the advantages of this new delivery system will be 
more readily apparent.32 
1 suggest that, by the mid- I 990s, group pre-paid and insurance plans 
will be a recognized and well-established element in the panoply of legal 
services offered in Canada. The extent to which these plans will assist 
in providing less costly legal services to middle-income consumers is unclear, 
but undoubtedly they will provide an affordable vehicle for the purchase 
of legal advice and assistance with respect to certain "typical" legal problems. 
4. LEGAL AID SERVICES 
Much has been written about the phenomenal growth of legal aid 
31 Note 4, above, at 202, where, in a discussion of the federal government's responsibilities 
with respect to legal aid, the authors of the study write: 
ln the case of the working poor, considcrntion ~h o11ld be given to wh1:thc1 11 101111 
of govcrn 111cnt-subsicli7cd prc-puicl lcg11I sc1viccs might he nduptcd to 11lctt tl ll' n 
lcgA I needs. 
12 M 1\j111 y, " Into the 1·111 ol P1 ~1p11icl l~·x1 il S1• 1 vi('(·~" (l'IXI) ~ ( '1111. ( '11111111111111 v I ' I. •I' 
Ill i\(• 
Making The Justice System Balance / 249 
services in Canada and much of the Western world during the last several 
decades. The governing bodies and the professional organizations of 
Canadian lawyers have exhibited a growing interest in legal aid matters 
since the creation of the Ontario Legal Aid Plan in 1967. The provincial 
law societies have attempted to administer the legal aid plans through 
committees generally composed of lawyers. In provinces where such direct 
control has been opposed by the provincial government, the law societies 
have nevertheless sought, and have generally obtained, a significant and 
dominant voice in the administration of legal aid plans while simultaneously 
asserting their members' claims to adequate payment for legal assistance. 
The organized legal profession's intentions and attitudes toward the 
various provincial legal aid plans have often been unclear. It has been, 
and remains, my opinion that the Canadian legal profession's positive 
response to government-funded legal aid grew out of the stimulation of 
employment and the provision of a significant source of income for the 
growing number of young lawyers. As well, the system's attractiveness 
was increased by the profession's enhanced public image in providing funded 
legal aid assistance to some of the country's impoverished. Although it 
is rather late in arriving, the support of the legal profession can no longer 
be doubted. The Canadian Bar Association, in the report of its National 
Legal Aid Liaison Committee, is forthrightly assertive in its advocacy on 
behalf of legal aid services in this country: 
Legal aid is not an expensive social experiment, affordable only in times 
of economic growth. Rather, it is the expression of the basic, democratic 
principle of the protection of the rights of individuals against the overwhelming 
power of the state. As such, legal aid is essential in order to ensure equal 
access to justice in our society. Justice is indivisible; if it is not accessible 
to everyone then it does not exist.33 
The commitment of the organized profession to legal aid services 
cannot be underestimated in terms of its impact on the development of 
similar funding commitments by the federal and provincial governments 
to enhanced funding. Nonetheless, the Canadian legal profession remains 
wary of salaried lawyers and continues to perpetuate a rather narrow 
perspective on legal aid services as confined to individualized claims handled 
as far as possible by lawyers in a similar fashion to those of their private 
clientelc. Two recent studies, one by the federal government and one by 
the Canadian Bar Association, have acknowledged that legal aid has become 
a component of the social services network in Canada and that such services 
t I I ' 1111111111111 1111 1 i\N~1w111 t 1 1 111 N111i11111il I 1•11111 Aul I i11Nn11 ( ' n111111ll llT, //11• 1111wl.1•/111111/' I <')1111 
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are provided by the public sector as well as the private sector and generally 
at a lesser cost. The analysis of federally-funded services by the Neilson 
Task Force creates a cost-effectiveness back-drop to contemporary 
discussions of legal services. While recognizing the commitment of federal 
resources to legal aid, the Report is written in the minor key of "restraint": 
The justice system is at a turning point for a wide variety of reasons. Principally 
these have to do with the stresses inherent in operating overburdened , costly 
institutions in times of restraint, and the advances that have been made in 
making the law and the institutions that give effect to it more reflective of 
the principle of social equity.34 
I will return to the question of restraint and its impact on legal aid 
services, but let us briefly examine the legal aid structure that has been 
erected by the provinces with considerable financial assistance from the 
federal government during the last two decades. In l 984-85, $182.1 million, 
or $7.22 per capita, was expended on legal aid. On an inflation-adjusted 
basis, the national per capita expenditure on legal aid declined slightly 
in 1984-85, following minimal increases in the two previous years.35 Per 
capita expenditures on legal aid vary significantly from province to province, 
with Quebec at $9. 17 having the highest provincial per capita expenditure, 
and Prince Edward Island having the lowest, with a per capita expenditure 
of $1.55.36 As well, the fluctuation in provincial legal aid expenditures 
varies from year to year. The national per capita expenditures decreased 
by 3% during 1984-85 on an inflation-adjusted basis; the most notable 
decreases were reported in New Brunswick (down 14%), Ontario and 
Manitoba (both down 6%), and British Columbia (down 10%). 
Although the provinces are charged with responsiblity for the 
administration of justice-a fact that has allowed a diversity of legal aid 
plans to develop in Canada- the federal government has a growing financial 
investment in legal aid plans. Commencing in the early 1970s, the federal 
government agreed to fund approximately 50% of criminal legal 
34 Note 4, above, at 11. 
35 Statistics Canada, Legal Aid in Canada (1985) Figure 4, at 129. In constant dollars, 
per capita expenditures on legal aid rose from $7. 19 in 198 1-82, to $7.36 in 1982-83, 
to $7.43 in 1983-84, to fall back to $7.22 in 1984-85. 
36 Ibid. Figure 3, at 129. 1984-85 per capita ex penditures on legal 11id n1111-1ed from Eustcrn 
provincial lows of: P.E. I., at $1.55; Newfoundland , at $2.43; New ll11111~wick , 111 $2.H l; 
and Nova Scot ia. at $4. 12; to Central Cam1dn. 11hovc the n11ti11nul 11vr1111-1t•, w11h Q11t•ht'l'. 
at $9. 17; Ontario, al $7.77 and Mnnito lm, 111 $7.79; 1111d till' 1'111i11t· 1'1 ov111t'"' • l1phtly 
below tlw 111111011111 nvl·11111c with S11•~11tl'ht•w1111, 111 !i\K\ /\lht•1t11, 111 'lt•l 110 1111d ll1111Hl1 
( 'ol 111nh111 , 111 :Ii~ 7'1 . 
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expenditures.37 As the cost of legal aid has escalated, the provinces have 
expressed dissatisfaction with the criminal legal aid cost-sharing formu la, 
which has seen the federal contribution fall to approximately 46% of 
national criminal legal aid costs. 38 
The costs of civil legal aid are shared under the Canada Assistance 
Plan (C.A.P.) as an "item of special need," provided to persons defined 
as "needy" under the "assistance" provisions of the scheme. C.A.P. has 
become a vehicle for underwriting the cost of provincial legal aid programs 
on an open-ended basis, resulting in substantial financial advantages to 
participating provinces.39 The funding of civi l legal aid under C.A.P. was 
approximately $22 million in 1985. 
The tension over fund ing and the rising costs of legal aid may have 
temporarily abated pending renegotiation of the federal-provincial cost-
sharing agreement in 1990, as well as the reduced emphasis on "cost per 
case" by the federal government. But the current arrangements remain 
in conflict with each other. The federal-provincial agreement with respect 
to criminal legal aid attempts to impose minimum standards concerning 
representation in criminal matters and has been criticized for its 
ineffectiveness in this regard and for setting ceilings on the federal 
contribution. The Canada Assistance Plan's funding of civil legal aid was 
established by the Federal Department of Health and Welfare and has 
been criticized for having no ceiling and no minimum standards.40 The 
37 Note 4, above, at 198-200. Federal-provincial agreements respecting the provision of 
criminal legal aid have been in place since 1972-73. Essentially, the agreements require 
the "provincial agency" to provide legal aid to eligible applicants in all serious criminal 
cases, that is, in all indictable offenses or in summary conviction matters where there 
is likelihood of imprisonment or loss of means of earning a livelihood. Criminal legal 
aid costs delivered by the provinces have grown from $11 million in 1973-74, to 
approximately $90 million in 1985-86. 
38 The provinces seek 50/ 50, open-ended cost-sharing in all areas of legal aid on the view 
that the federal government should "share the risk" in meeting the demand for legal 
aid services created by the mandatory coverage requirements in the federal-provincial 
agreement. 
39 Note 33, above, at 20. The Report notes the open-ended basis of the C.A.P. funding 
of civil legal aid and expresses concern about the open-ended funding of provincial civil 
legal aid without any significant increase in service. 
40 Ibid., at 20. The Report underlines that there arc currently three standing legal aid cost-
shnring arrangements between the provincial and federal governments: the adult criminal 
nncl Young Offenders /\ct rigrccmcn1 ncgol iatect by the Fcdernl J usticc Department with 
lhl' 1'1 ov1111: inl Ministries of' the A110111cy (icncnil; the C'unuda Assistance Plan (C.A.P), 
1111dt·1 whwh 1111" h•1lt-111I lkp111J11w111 nl lknllh 1111d WclJ'111c h11s 1111rcctl lo share lhc 
n 1~1 ul n v1l lrg11l 111d 111nv11kd lo Jhosr q1111hly111111111d1•1 111nv111ri11I sor inl wl'i ln n· d1g1hili1 y 
11111·1111 
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legal profession has queried whether, in responding to the federal funding 
priorities, the provincial legal aid schemes have set their priorities based 
on federal funding rather than on quality of services or community needs: 
In responding to this confusion, some provinces have had to cut corners, 
limit coverage and distort priorities in order to enhance or protect federal 
recoveries. If services are to be cut, they wi ll tend to be where there are 
no minimum standards; if services are to be added, they will tend to be where 
there are no payment ceilings.4 ' 
The recent study of the National Legal Aid Liaison Committee of 
the Canadian Bar Association, Legal Aid Delivery Models: A Discussion 
Paper, attempts to clarify the ongoing debate in Canada concerning the 
cost of legal aid. The paper's authors are critical of those studies that 
compare provincial schemes on a "straight-cost" basis. Concern is expressed 
that a straight-cost analysis of judicare or staff lawyer models ignores 
the significant question of quality: 
The flip side of cost is quality. Without holding quality constant across cases, 
cost differences reflect little more than differences in quality. For example, 
in a staff lawyer model, one can crank up the caseload per lawyer, with 
an attendant drop in quality, and produce lower costs per case. Equally, in 
a judicare model, one can depress the tariff, thereby reducing costs and likely 
also quality.42 
As with most legal aid systems in industrialized states, provincial legal 
aid services in Canada are oriented toward representing clients involved 
with the courts, and an attempt is made by most plans to compare the 
legal aid recipient with the fee-paying client in determining whether services 
should be given. In fact, legal aid schemes have continued to ignore the 
differences between recipients of legal aid services and more typical users 
of the legal system and have refused to acknowledge that "poor people 
are not just like rich people without money" and that their socio-legal 
problems are distinct.43 
In two provinces, New Brunswick and Alberta, legal aid is delivered 
exclusively by the judicare model, where all criminal and civil legal aid 
services are delivered by private lawyers and the plans are administered 
by a committee or board reporting to the provincial law society. In contrast, 
Saskatchewan, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island are at the other 
41 /hid., at 20-2 1. 
42 Noll' 29, ahow, 111 t1 
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end of the legal aid spectrum, with virtually all legal aid provided by 
salaried lawyers.44 
Jn the other provinces, various forms of the mixed delivery system 
have developed. These models of legal aid have become known as "the 
Canadian compromise" because of their mixing of the English judicare 
with the American community-based salaried lawyer system. Judicare is 
the dominant aspect of the mixed delivery model in Manitoba and British 
Columbia, while in Quebec and Newfoundland, the proportions are reversed 
with 60 to 70% of legal aid cases handled by staff lawyers.45 Ontario has 
a successful mixed delivery system, combining the judicare and clinic models 
of service. Although it initially opposed community-based clinics with 
salaried lawyers and a more broadly based welfare rights agenda, the 
profession in Ontario has gradually come to accept the concept. There 
are over 60 clinics in Ontario, operating with many of the features of 
the original American welfare rights model of legal services. Some of these 
clinics provide specialized legal services or serve specific constituencies such 
as the elderly, tenants, or younger people. Community-elected boards of 
directors have some authority to set both case criteria and eligibility 
standards for their clinics, allowing the clinics to move beyond a totally 
service-dominated program and to attempt to achieve a more reform-
oriented approach to the provision of legal services. As an auxiliary to 
the established judicare scheme, the Ontario clinics have generally developed 
a more strategic approach to legal services, and in many instances have 
moved beyond a service model to become involved to some extent in 
community education, community development, and some significant law 
reform litigation. 
44 In these provinces, private lawyer participation is generally restricted to mandated choice 
of counsel required in capital cases and occasionally in conflict situations. Saskatchewan 
and Nova Scotia have plans administered under a public legal aid commission, dominated 
by government appointees, whereas P.E.1.'s plan is administered through its Department 
of Justice. 
45 Jn Manitoba and British Columbia, a mixed delivery system of judicare and staff lawyers 
exists, with 70 to 75% of the cases handled by private lawyers. The B.C. model reflects 
its historical and structural origins in a carefully balanced merger of the Legal Aid Society 
and the Legal Services Society of British Columbia. The Manitoba scheme has evolved 
in response to the changing political scenery of the province. The Legal Services 
Commission of British Columbia is evenly balanced between Law Society and government 
nominees, whereas Manitoba's plan, under the N.D.P. provincial government, had 
government nominees predominate. 
Quebec's 111ix1 urc of cases handled by salaried and private lawyers is an outgrowth 
ol llw f)lan·~ 1·111ph11sis ll11 snl111icd luwycrs working in local and regional bureaux. 
N1·wl111111dl11111l 'N 1111x111n· 11ppl0 111s lo huvt" ll'SlllH·d h olll l11111nci11l fncto1'>. Sec l.egal Aid 
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Much of the recent academic literature as well as professional and 
government analysis has focused on a comparison of the various ~odels 
of legal services. Much of this literature has tended to be defensive ~r 
argumentative, and very little sophisticated analysis has emerged. Yet 1t 
is possible to state that a consensus seems to be emergi~g .in favo~r of 
the mixed delivery model. The 1985 Canadian Bar Association National 
Legal Aid Liaison Committee Report, "Patterns in Legal Aid," noted that 
"in equivalent cases, staff lawyers generally provide similar s.ervices for 
less. " This has been confirmed by provincial studies in Nova Scotia, Quebec, 
and British Columbia.46 
A recent evaluation study of Manitoba legal aid found that, on average, 
for most family cases, judicare lawyers take 50% longer. In criminal cases, 
private practitioners take as much as 200% long~r than. their staff lawy.er 
counterparts.47 The disparities are particularly noticeable m the first quartile 
of case costs, with the staff lawyers' average being approximately one-
quarter of the cost of the private bar, which fact _rro~oked t~e eva~uator 
to recommend changing the tariff structure to mrnuruze the mcenttve to 
maximize time.48 It should be noted that the Manitoba study deals 
46 The British Columbia Study, Burnaby Evaluation, Report lll (1981), analyzed the cost 
of delivering criminal legal services under a salaried public defender system and concluded 
that there is little difference in per unit cost of services whether provided by salaried 
lawyers or through fee-for-service using lawyers in private practice. In contrast, The 
Quebec study, Evaluation de /'Aide Juridique (1982), confirmed the cost-effectiveness 
of the salaried model, which handled over two-thirds of the case load. 
The Nova Scotia Legal Aid Evaluation Report (1983) at 277, found that the average 
cost per case during 1981-82 was 143% higher for cases referred to the private bar than 
for those taken by staff lawyers. This example, however, illustrates some of the problems 
that arise from this kind of comparison. For one thing, it gives no indication of what 
kind of cases were referred, which could have a significant impact on the actual case 
cost. Furthermore, only 2% of the cases were referred to private lawyers, thus rendering 
the two models virtually incomparable. See Legal A id Delivery Mod({ls: A Discussion 
Paper, note 29, above, at 35. 
47 Sloan, Legal Aid in Manitoba: An Evaluation Report (1987) at 211-2 19 and 8~-86. 
Manitoba's evaluation found that clients who were self-described "winners" rate pnvate 
Bar lawyers more highly than staff lawyers on quality-of-service indicators'. whil~ "losers" 
were less critical generally of their staff lawyers than they were of thelf pnvate Bar 
counterparts. 
48 This differential was evaluated, ibid., at 202, by referring to the different att itude ol 
private lawyers who were perceived to have a tendency to "hand-hold" thei1 clients, 
taking care of even their non-legal needs, thus engaging in "~trutegic billing" by t 1c11 t1 n~ 
the tariff as a minimum bill: 
Jn the consultation phase, ltiwycrs indicated that uppcnsing clients nnd k1'l' l1in11 tlwn1 
ca lm resulted both in satisfactiun 011 the p111t ol the l'lil' lli 11nd 111 fl 1Wl ll11 
1cprcscntntion ... 11 It h, being ' "llACstcd hl' ll' thnt "lrnhyN11t i1111" 111 "11111111 huld111~1" 
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exclusively with high-volume cases, comprising 55% of the total caseload. 
The differential for low-volume cases appears to be more modest.49 
Recent legal aid evaluations have begun to grapple with the question 
of the quality of legal aid services, recognizing that the cost-effectiveness 
debate becomes a digression from the crucial discussion of the 
democratization of legal services and the provision of appropriate legal 
services to respond to the socio-economic needs of underprivileged and 
low-income persons. Mary Jane Mossman wrote several years ago that, 
To an extent, the focus on the cost-effectiveness has distracted from, rather 
than contributed to a better understanding of legal aid objectives. Thus, rather 
than questioning decisions about equality objectives or the appropriate 
approaches to providing legal aid services, most legal aid efforts have been 
directed to assessing models of delivering such services; and because both 
salaried and private practice lawyers provide essentially similar services, the 
focus on cost-effectiveness has been directed very narrowly indeed.50 
There is no doubt that the quality and models of legal services remain 
significant issues for the funders and providers of legal services. An holistic 
analysis of legal aid services would obviously attempt to ascertain the 
attitude of the public and the communities served with respect to these 
issues. Such analysis is only currently beginning to develop.51 
5. CONCLUSION 
In examining the significant recent developments in Canada with 
respect to access to justice, it becomes clear that issues of quantity and 
quality are inevitably in tension and that similar tensions have been carried 
forward to the more recent development of pre-paid legal services. We 
find limited evidence that concern for community needs or the principles 
articulated for the justice system by the Zuber Report have permeated 
49 Note 29, above, at 46-47. It is particularly in high-volume cases that the staff lawyer 
has an opportunity to take advantage of the economics of specialization. The average 
experience for staff lawyers in Manitoba is nine years in practice, thus giving ample 
opportunity to develop specialized knowledge and experience. This advantage is magnified 
by the fact that staff casework is divided by department into areas of expertise. 
50 Mossman. "Legal Aid in Canada" (unpublished paper presented to the 7th International 
Congress on Procedural Law at Wurzburg, 1983) at 56. 
5 1 The proposed evaluation of the Ontario Legal Aid Plan should give considerable insight 
into the judicarc side of the plan. Unfortunately, very little research is being conducted 
in the fi1 st evaluation of the Ontario plan to allow for real comparison between the 
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the Canadian legal profession. The uneasy partnership that has existed 
between government and the legal profession with respect to legal aid 
and other new models of legal services continues. Though committed to 
expanding government-funded legal aid, the profession provides only 
limited pro bono services in an organized fashion, with British Columbia 
being the exception to this generalization. 
Despite concerns expressed about motivation, the ongoing support 
of legal aid services by the Canadian legal profession has stimulated the 
growth of federal and provincial funding. Today, the profession is active 
in virtually all aspects of the development and administration of legal 
aid. Within judicare jurisdictions, most regions have area committees that 
are composed primarily of volunteer members, generaUy lawyers, who set 
policy and deal with appeals. The provincial base of legal aid and the 
active involvement of the provincial law societies has meant that the 
profession has been vigilant about government's attempts to restrict funding 
or to re-organize legal aid services. Canadian lawyers are committed to 
the various models of legal aid that are subsidized by government and 
would tolerate neither an attempt to dismantle the existing programs nor 
a massive reduction of government funding, as was seen in the United 
States in the early 1980s. Questions regarding the services that should 
be handled by the developing access to justice schemes and the appropriate 
model or models of legal services are far from settled. Debate as to whether 
we should encourage private practitioners to provide the legal services 
for previously unserviced members of Canadian society or whether we 
should opt rather for the staff-and-clinic model of legal services continues 
in light of government concern about escalating costs. Although some 
balance appears to be developing between these extremes, tensions remain 
between the goals of individual clients and a broad social justice agenda. 
As we move forward into the era of the Charter and the implications 
of its provisions, the issues of communal justice and social inequality cry 
to be addressed. Canadians must clarify the role of a responsive, fully 
funded, and expeditious justice system that is accountable to the Canadian 
public within the contemporary welfare state. 
